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I.

Introduction

The Institute for Intellectual Property and Information Law at the University of Houston
Law Center publishes “www.patstats.org,” providing United States patent litigation statistics.
Specifically, with respect to the issue of validity, in 2000, the alleged infringer “won” the issue
53 percent of the time and the patent was held invalid, while the patentee “won” the issue only
47 percent of the time, and the patent was held valid. In 2001, the patentees faired much better,
with the alleged infringer “winning” the issue 28 percent of the time, and the patentee “winning”
the issue 72 percent of the time.
A finding of invalidity is a win for an alleged infringer and a loss for the patentee. The
means of reaching an invalid verdict are therefore of great concern to patent practitioners and
inventors. This paper explores the On-Sale Bar found in section 102(b) and its application to a
finding of patent invalidity during litigation. A finding of invalidity under section 102(b) can be
avoided through careful planning during the prosecution of the patent. An examination of the
1
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case law on this issue gives rise to practice tips that can be employed by the patent practitioner
during prosecution to later avoid a finding of invalidity during litigation.
II.

35 U.S.C. § 102(b) – On-Sale Bar

Section 102(b) provides that, “a person shall be entitled to a patent unless—the invention
was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or
on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
U.S.” 1 Therefore, section 102(b) provides three reasons why a person would not be entitled to a
patent: (1) a patent or printed publication; (2) public use; and (3) on sale. The on-sale bar
provides that a person is not entitled to a patent under section 102(b) if the invention was “on
sale in this country” more than one year prior to the date of the application for the patent.
According to “patstats.org,” in 2000, the patentee prevailed five times and the alleged infringer
prevailed ten times when the on-sale bar issue arose. In 2001, the patentee prevailed eight times
with the alleged infringer prevailing five times. In the first two quarters of 2002, the patentee
prevailed eight times with the alleged infringer prevailing eleven times. Therefore, when the onsale bar issue arises, more likely than not, the patent at issue is invalidated.
III.

Supreme Court Case of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics

In 1998, the Supreme Court decided the case of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.

2

The

case addressed the issue of the on-sale bar under section 102(b), and set out a new test to be
applied by the courts in determining a patent’s validity:
The on-sale bar applies when two conditions are satisfied before the critical date [one
year before the patent application filing date]. First, the product must be the offer of a
commercial offer for sale … Second, the invention must be ready for patenting … by
proof of reduction to practice before the critical date; or by proof that prior to the critical

1
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Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
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date the inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were
sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the invention. 3
In this case, Pfaff had developed a device and made sales of that device prior to April 8,
1981, and these devices were shipped in July of 1981. Pfaff did not file a patent application on
the device until April 19, 1982. Since Pfaff made sales of the device prior to the critical date of
April 19, 1981, the claims of the patent were invalid.
The Supreme Court reversed the holdings of earlier courts and held that a product can be
“on-sale” even if the product has not yet been reduced to practice.

Pfaff’s drawings and

descriptions, which he sent to the seller, were sufficiently detailed to enable a person skilled in
the art to make and use his device, and were also sufficiently detailed to be the basis of a patent
application. The Supreme Court also discussed the policy considerations of the patent system
being a balance between encouraging creation and disclosure of new technology and a limited
period of exclusive use for the inventor. The Court reaffirmed the experimental use exception by
recognizing the distinction between experimental use and commercial sales.
IV.

CAFC Cases after the Pfaff Decision

The Supreme Court’s Pfaff decision is very short (approximately six pages in the
reporter), therefore, leaving a number of the details with respect to implementation of the new
test to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”). We therefore defer to the CAFC
to guide us, particularly with respect to the qualifications of a “commercial offer for sale.”
A.

Patent’s Presumption of Validity
The CAFC has stated that there is a statutory presumption of validity found at section

282, specifically, “A patent is presumed to be valid,…and this presumption can only be
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overcome by clear and convincing evidence of facts to the contrary. Whether a patent is invalid
for a public use or sale is a question of law based on underlying facts.” 4 The CAFC has also
discussed the deference due to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) in
determining the patentability of an application by interpreting references. Specifically, the
CAFC has stated, “The presumption of validity reflects the deference due the PTO’s
determination of patentability and the administrative regularity underlying the patent grant.” 5
The standard applied to the on-sale bar is a question of law, based on underlying facts.
The CAFC has provided a clear explanation of the evidentiary standard required to establish a
finding of invalidity based on the on-sale bar. In Tec Air, the court held that the defendant:
[M]ust demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that there was a definite sale or
offer to sell more than one year before the application for the subject patent, and that the
subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully anticipated the claimed invention or would
have rendered the claimed invention obvious by its addition to the prior art. 6
B.

Claim Construction
To invalidate a patent claim, the claim terms and the claim as a whole must be construed

to determine their meaning and scope. Once the scope and meaning of the claim is determined,
then it can be determined if the prior art anticipates the claim. The CAFC, in Helifix Ltd.,
discussed the steps of claim construction:
The first step of an anticipation analysis is claim construction. Claim construction is a
question of law that we review de novo. In construing patent claims, we look to the
intrinsic evidence of record — the claims, the specification, and, if in evidence, the
prosecution history. If intrinsic evidence resolves all ambiguities, extrinsic evidence is
not considered. 7

4

Dana Corp. v. Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc., 279 F.3d 1372, 1375 (2002).
Dethmers Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Automatic Equip. Mfg. Co., 293 F.3d 1364, 1365 (2002).
6
Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Michigan Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1358 (1999).
7
Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1346 (2000).
5
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C.

Claim Analysis
Following Pfaff, a series of cases on the issue of invalidity and the on sale were heard by

the CAFC.

One of the earliest of these cases was Scaltech Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C.

8

(“Scaltech I”), where the CAFC reheard a previously decided case “to take account of the
intervening Supreme Court decision in Pfaff.” 9 The Scaltech court held that the “analysis must
be whether the barring activity met each of the limitations of the claim, and thus was an
embodiment of the claimed invention.” 10
After construing the claims, the second step in the anticipation analysis is to compare the
construed claims to the prior art. For a reference to anticipate, “a prior art reference must
‘disclose each and every limitation of the claimed invention[,] ... must be enabling[,] and [must]
describe ... [the] claimed invention sufficiently to have placed it in possession of a person of
ordinary skill in the field of the invention.’” 11 However, if a patent claim has multiple
embodiments or compositions, only one of them need be sold to anticipate the claim. Therefore,
as held in Brasseler, “it is not necessary … to show that all embodiments of the invention were
on sale more than one year before filing. It is sufficient to show that one embodiment of the
invention was offered for sale.” 12
The CAFC, in Dana Corp., further explained the claim limitation analysis requirement.
The court held claims cannot be invalidated in a wholesale fashion, because each claim of a
patent is presumed valid, and must be analyzed independently. Specifically, the court stated,

8

Scaltech Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 178 F.3d 1378 (1999) [hereinafter Scaltech I].
Id. at 1380.
10
Id. at 1383.
11
Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1346.
12
Scaltech Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 269 F.3d 1321, 1330 (2001) [hereinafter Scaltech II].
9
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“[A] court may not invalidate the claims of a patent without construing the disputed limitations
of the claims and applying them to the allegedly invalidating acts.” 13 Similar to the court
holding in Schumer, the Sandt court held that “[b]ecause dependent claims contain additional
limitations, they cannot be presumed to be invalid as obvious just because the independent
claims from which they depend have been properly so found.” 14
The claim analysis may not be required where the sale of the defendant’s products
infringed the claims. This circumstance was present in Vanmoor, and the claim analysis was not
required since the patentee alleged that sales of the defendant’s products infringed its claims.
These same sales were used to invalidate the claims under the on-sale bar (the defendants
conceded infringement for the purposes of the on-sale bar analysis). Necessarily, if a product
infringes a claim, then that product meets every claim limitation. In this case, infringing sales
prior to the critical date served to invalidate the very claims they were infringing. Here, the court
held:
Although Wal-Mart and the manufacturers bore the burden of proving that the cartridges
that were the subject of the pre-critical date sales anticipated the ‘331 patent, that burden
was satisfied by Vanmoor’s allegation that the accused cartridges infringe the ‘331
patent. 15
D.

Inherency
An offer for sale need not expressly state all of the claim limitations in order to invalidate

the claim. The on-sale bar can invalidate a claim if the sale inherently anticipates all of the
claim’s limitations. The Scaltech I court discussed the issue of inherency:
If the process that was offered for sale inherently possessed each of the claim limitations,
then the process was on sale, whether or not the seller recognized that his process

13

Dana Corp., 279 F.3d at 1376.
Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1316-17 (2002).
15
Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 1363, 1366 (2000).
14
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possessed the claimed characteristics. Inherency may not be established by probabilities
or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing
may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient … [h]owever, if the natural
result flowing from the operation of the process offered for sale would
necessarily result in achievement of each of the claim limitations, then [the] claimed
invention was offered for sale. 16
The CAFC again addressed the issue of inherency in Scaltech II. Following their holding
in Scaltech I, the CAFC held that it is irrelevant whether or not the parties knew in which form of
the product they were dealing. In J.A. LaPorte, a case very similar to Abbot, the court held, “The
question is not whether the sale … ‘discloses’ the invention at the time of the sale, but whether
the sale relates to a device that embodies the invention.” 17 Therefore, the CAFC has held that
there is no requirement that the invention be recognized or appreciated, 18

but rather,

“[i]nherency is established if ‘the natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result
in the performance of the questioned function.’” 19
E.

Commercial Offer for Sale
The CAFC has addressed the issue of what qualified as a “commercial offer for sale” a

number of times since the Pfaff decision. Many patentees have invited the CAFC to develop
exceptions to the general rule, and have met with limited success, as discussed below in Section
F. However, the “experimental use” exception is still viable law, and will be discussed further in
Section G.
The CAFC defined a sale as “a contract between parties to give and to pass rights of
property for consideration which the buyer pays or promises to pay the seller for the thing bought

16

Scaltech I, 178 F.3d at 1383-84.
Abbott Laboratories v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 182 F.3d 1318, 1318-19 (1999).
18
Scaltech II, 269 F.3d at 1330.
19
Id. at 1329.
17

7

1 OKLA. J. L. & TECH. 4 (2003)
(formerly 2003 OKJOLT Rev. 4)
www.okjolt.org
or sold.” 20 The parties to the contract must be separate entities, which the CAFC defines as lack
of common ownership or control. 21 The Pfaff court held that an offer is analyzed under common
law and Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) contract law principles:
In Pfaff, the Supreme Court noted that the norms of traditional contract law should be the
basis for the on-sale determinations under § 102(b)[;] … an offer for sale, whether made
before or after a patent is applied for, or after it is granted, requires no more than a
commercial offer for sale. Both sections [102(b) & 271(a)] invoke the traditional
contractual analysis[;] … the meaning of ‘offer to sell’ is to be interpreted according to
its ordinary meaning in contract law, as revealed by traditional sources of authority. 22
In Pfaff, the Supreme Court adopted the common law of contracts approach to bring
greater certainty to the on-sale bar analysis. In applying the common law approach, the CAFC
has held that the subject is a matter of Federal Circuit law to ensure uniformity:
[T]o be analyzed under the law of contracts as generally understood … we will look to
the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) to define whether, as in this case, a
communication or series of communications rises to the level of a commercial offer for
sale … Only an offer which rises to the level of a commercial offer for sale, one which
the other party could make into a binding contract by simple acceptance (assuming
consideration), constitutes an offer for sale under §102(b)… [C]ontract law traditionally
recognizes that mere advertising and promoting of a product may be nothing more than
an invitation for offers, while responding to such an invitation may itself be an offer. 23
In creating this body of Federal Circuit law, the CAFC has looked to other state and
federal courts that have analyzed and interpreted the UCC, and have looked for common themes
among their decisions in order that they may find a “common denominator for assistance in
crafting the federal common law of contract that now governs the on-sale bar.” 24 Following, the
Federal Circuit has defined an offer as “the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain,

20

Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 182 F.3d 888, 890 (1999).
Id. at 890.
22
Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (2000).
23
Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047-48 (2001).
24
Linear Tech. v. Micrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1048 (2001).
21
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so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and
will conclude it.” 25
The on-sale bar can be satisfied by a sale or by an offer for sale. If only the offer portion
of the sale occurred prior to the critical date, and the remainder of the sale occurred after the
critical date, then the claim can still be held invalid: “The fact that delivery was set for dates
after the critical date is irrelevant to the finding of a commercial offer to sell.” 26 Even if there is
only an offer, the on-sale bar can be satisfied: “An offer for sale does not have to be accepted to
implicate the on sale bar.” 27
In the Linear Tech. case, the CAFC addressed a number of preliminary activities. The
court held none of the activities constituted an offer, since none of the activities indicated intent
to be bound. In particular, the preliminary activities at issue were:
(1) LTC’s solicitation of pricing information from its distributors and sales
representatives; (2) LTC’s publication of preliminary data sheets and promotional
information on the LT1070; (3) LTC’s communications to its sales force in its
newsletters and via the sales conference in July of 1985, and the sales representatives’
communications with customers providing them with the LT1070
preliminary data sheets; and (4) sales representatives’ pre-critical date requests for
LT1070 samples to give to specific customers. 28
The CAFC has reviewed a number of different activities as to whether or not they
constitute an offer or a sale, providing guidance for the patent practitioner. Among these, the
CAFC has held that providing samples of the product, without more, is not a commercial offer or
sale, because there is no offer for the receiver of the samples to accept. 29 The CAFC has also
held that a license of the patent rights is not a commercial offer for sale that would trigger the on-

25

Id. at 1050.
STX, LLC v. Brine, Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 590 (2000).
27
Scaltech II, 269 F.3d at 1328.
28
Linear Techn., 275 F.3d at 1049.
29
Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1308 (2002).
26
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sale bar, specifically stating that “an assignment or sale of the rights in the invention and
potential patent rights is not a sale of ‘the invention’ within the meaning of section 102(b) …
The ‘right to commercialize’ the invention granted to Celanese pursuant to the agreement in the
form of a license is therefore insufficient to bar the claims of the ‘564 application under
§102(b).” 30
For patent applications filed in the United States, the critical date is one year before the
earliest filing date from which the application claims priority. For Patent Cooperation Treaty
(“PCT”) applications, the critical date is determined differently, “Under 35 U.S.C. § 363, the
United States filing date, for § 102(b) purposes, of a patent application filed under the PCT in
which the United States is designated, is the date of the PCT application.” 31
F.

Unrecognized Exceptions
There are a number of circumstances that the CAFC has held to be irrelevant, and

therefore, are examples of unrecognized exceptions. The CAFC has held that it is not relevant if
the contract is cost-plus, or if the buyer will be using the products to determine their
compatibility with the buyer’s application (if the product has already been reduced to practice):
“A contract to supply goods is a sales contract, regardless of the means used to calculate
payment and regardless of whether the goods are to be used for testing in a laboratory or for
deployment in the field.” 32 It is also irrelevant if the seller is the patentee or an unrelated third
party; “the statutory on-sale bar is not subject to exceptions for sales made by third parties either

30

In re Kollar., 286 F.3d 1326, 1331 (2002).
Group One, 254 F.3d at 1044.
32
Zacharin v. United States, 213 F.3d 1366, 1370 (2000).
31
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innocently or fraudulently.” 33 The Zacharin court held that a third party, not the inventor, can
make the sale or that the buyer can direct the product construction. 34
In Brasseler, CAFC declined to establish an exception to the on-sale bar for joint
development.34 Here the court plainly stated that it has never recognized the existence of a joint
development exception to the separate entities requirement: “We decline Brasseler’s invitation
to establish a new exception based on the fact (alleged) that it and DS Manufacturing were joint
developers … we have never recognized a ‘joint development’ exception to the ‘on sale’ bar.” 35
The issue of separate entities was addressed in Netscape, where the determining factor
was held to be “control” by the seller over the buyer. The court held, “Where … both parties to
an alleged commercial offer for sale receive research funds from the same entity, it may be more
difficult to determine whether the inventor is attempting to commercialize his invention.” 36
In separate entities situations, the court looks to whether the seller controls the purchaser
so that the “invention remains out of the public’s hands.” 37
Nor has the CAFC recognized a “supplier” exception. The CAFC has found that there is
no basis for a “supplier” exception in the statute or the precedent, and in Special Devices, held
that sales for the “purpose of commercial stockpiling of an invention,” even where the sales were
secret, deserve no special treatment under the on-sale bar. 38 In Brasseler, the court held that

33

Abbott, 182 F.3d at 1318.
Zacharin, 213 F.3d at 1371.
35
Brasseler, 182 F.3d at 890.
36
Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1324 (2002).
37
Id. at 1324.
38
Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1357-58 (2001).
34
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there is no “secret sales” exception, and that the public does not need to be aware of the sales to
“trigger the on-sale bar.” 39
G.

Experimental Use Exception
The experimental use exception recognizes the need of an inventor to place his product in

the real world or under actual use conditions to determine if it will work, and to make changes as
needed. The use must be primarily experimental, not for a profit, and for testing of the product
design; “if a use is experimental, even though not secret, ‘public use’ is negated.” 40 The CAFC
has also held that “a sale or offer for sale may escape the on-sale bar if the sale or offer was
‘merely incidental to the primary purpose of experimentation.’” 41 This issue was also addressed
by the CAFC in EZ Dock. The CAFC held that “[t]he law has long recognized the distinction
between inventions put to experimental use and products sold commercially … tests needed to
convince [the inventor] that the invention is capable of performing its intended purpose in its
intended environment.” 42 However, in order to show an experimental use, the invention must not
have already been reduced to practice when the “experimental sale” was made. Specifically, in
Zacharin, the court held that if the invention was reduced to practice prior to entering into a
contract for testing the invention, then the patentee cannot argue that the contract was made for
the purpose of testing his design. 43
Monon stands as a good example of the experimental use exception. In Monon, the
patentee sold a single trailer to a trucking company. Some of the factors the court discussed
were the patentee’s interactions with the trucking company to determine how the trailer was

39

Brasseler, 182 F.3d at 891.
Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 239 F.3d 1253, 1258 (2001).
41
Aqua Marine Supply v. Aim Machining, Inc., 247 F.3d 1216, 1218 (2001).
42
EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1352 (2002).
43
Zacharin, 213 F.3d at 1370.
40
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performing, the patentee’s inspections of the trailer during the test period, and the fact that the
patentee returned the trailer’s purchase price after the one-year test period. The court held that
the sale was experimental since the patentee needed to test the product in “conditions of actual
use” to determine if it would work, and it was not feasible for the patentee to test the product
himself. 44 Relevant factors in the EZ Dock case included the sales price, post-sale monitoring of
the performance of the invention, free repairs, and post-sale changes to the invention showing
that the invention had not yet been reduced to practice when the experimental sale was made. 45
In Allen Eng’g Corp., the CAFC set out an exhaustive list of factors that can be used to
determine if a sale was experimental in nature.

These factors are useful to the patent

practitioner; however, the court cautioned that not all the factors will apply in every situation:
These factors include: (1) the necessity for public testing, (2) the amount of control over
the experiment retained by the inventor, (3) the nature of the invention, (4) the length of
the test period, (5) whether payment was made, (6) whether there was a secrecy
obligation, (7) whether records of the experiment were kept, (8) who conducted the
experiment, . . . (9) the degree of commercial exploitation during testing[,] . . . (10)
whether the invention reasonably requires evaluation under actual conditions of use, (11)
whether testing was systematically performed, (12) whether the inventor continually
monitored the invention during testing, and (13) the nature of contacts made with
potential customers. 46
The Allen court addressed the factor of the relationship with the customer. Specifically,
the amount paid for the test product, and whether the customers knew that it was a test product
were issues for the district court to decide on remand, “A showing that Allen did not clearly
communicate to the users of the Red Rider that the use was to be for experimental purposes
makes recourse to experimental negation questionable.” 47

44

Monon, 239 F.3d at 1258-61.
EZ Dock, 276 F.3d at 1352-53.
46
Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (2002).
47
Id. at 1355.
45
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A fabricator exception may exist within the more general realm of the experimental use
exception, but it was not recognized on the facts of either Brasseler or Zacharin: “This is not a
case in which an individual inventor takes a design to a fabricator and pays the fabricator for its
services in fabricating a few sample products. Here DS Manufacturing made a large number of
the agreed-upon product for general marketing by Brasseler.” 48
H.

Ready for Patenting - Actual Reduction to Practice
A showing of an actual reduction to practice can satisfy Pfaff’s second requirement of

“ready for patenting.” Reduction to practice may have different definitions depending on the
technology area. For a composition of matter, for example, reduction to practice occurs “when it
is completely composed.” 49 An apparatus or device can be reduced to practice with a working
prototype, model, or commercial product. For example, in STX, the court held:
STX had sufficient grasp of its invention, even a model, to allow it to gain approval for
its design from the United States Intercollegiate Lacrosse Association Rules Committee,
and later produce the first squeezes that were the subject of the September 18, 1984 sale.
The same first squeezes were used in the trade show later that month. Such evidence is
sufficient to establish that the invention was ready for patenting. 50
In the case of an actual reduction to practice, there is no requirement to show actual
conception or understanding of the invention, rather, “[t]he sale of the material in question
obviates any need for inquiry into conception.” 51 In Abbot, the requirement of a reduction to
practice was satisfied by proving that the claimed invention had been reduced to practice by two
foreign manufacturers which were unrelated to the patentee. 52 There was a similar result in

48

Brasseler, 182 F.3d at 891.
Abbott, 182 F.3d at 1318.
50
STX, 211 F.3d at 591.
51
Abbott, 182 F.3d at 1318-19.
52
Id. at 1318.
49
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Vanmoor where domestic manufacturers and retailers invalidated the patent claims by pre critical
date sales; the CAFC held that there was no requirement that evidence be presented that would
enable a patent attorney to draft the patent. 53
I.

Ready for Patenting - Drawings and Descriptions
Pfaff’s second requirement of “ready for patenting” can also be satisfied by a showing

that, prior to the critical date, the inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the
invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the
invention. 54 This requirement can only be met by a showing that each element of the claimed
invention is illustrated and described by the drawings and descriptions. In Helifix, the court held
that “there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the … brochure discloses and enables
each element of the method claimed in the … patent. Accordingly, for purposes of summary
judgment, the … brochure cannot be relied upon as an enabling description of the invention.” 55
In the Robotic Vision Sys. case, an invention was found to be ready for patenting because
the inventor explained the invention to a programmer, who wrote the software for the use of the
invention:
[A] co-inventor … explained the invention to Daniel Briceno … and asked him to write
the software for full-tray scanning … This explanation was sufficiently specific for
Briceno to understand the invention and to write the software needed to implement the
method … it is undisputed that Briceno ultimately completed the software program
pursuant to Yonescu’s description of the invention; ... because Yonescu’s disclosure was
sufficiently specific to enable Briceno, a person skilled in the art, to practice the
invention, the district court did not err in concluding that the invention was ready for
patenting before the critical date. 56

53

Vanmoor, 201 F.3d at 1366-67.
Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1349.
55
Id. at 1350.
56
Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 249 F.3d 1307, 1311 (2001).
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One definition of an enabling disclosure is a “recipe” that enables a “chef” familiar with
that type of “cooking” to make the “dish.” 57 Specifically, in Scaltech II, the court held that the
“[d]ocument used to persuade CITGO to accept Scaltech’s offer to treat its hazardous waste
provides a description sufficient to satisfy the … requirement …This document was available
well before the critical date of January 19, 1992, and is essentially a ‘recipe’ that describes how
to process DAF float, which allows CITGO to practice an embodiment of the invention.” 58
If there are sufficient drawings or other descriptions of the invention, then no reduction to
practice is necessary. For example, referring again to the Robotic case, the court held that
“whether or not the software needed to implement the claimed method existed at the time of the
disclosure is irrelevant, provided that the disclosure of the invention was made prior to the
critical date and was sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the
invention.” 59 However, more than a conception is needed to satisfy the requirement. If undue
experimentation is required in order to teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the
invention, then the invention is not ready for patenting.

As stated by the court in Space

Sys./Loral Inc., “[W]hen development and verification are needed in order to prepare a patent
application that complies with §112, the invention is not yet ready for patenting.” 60
J.

Provisional Applications
In the New Railhead case, the patentee made commercial sales in the Spring and Summer

of 1996, filed a provisional application in February of 1997, and then filed a non-provisional
application claiming priority to the provisional application, in November of 1997. Therefore, the

57

Scaltech II, 269 F.3d at 1331.
Id.
59
Robotic, 249 F.3d at 1311.
60
Space Sys./Loral, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 271 F.3d 1076, 1080 (2001).
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sales were made less than one year before the provisional application, and more than one year
before the non-provisional application.
The issue to be addressed was whether the provisional application provided sufficient
support for the claims in the non-provisional application. Unfortunately for the patentee, there
was a claim limitation that was not found in the provisional application. The requirements for a
provisional application are that “the specification of the provisional must ‘contain a written
description of the invention and the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms’ … to enable an ordinarily skilled artisan to practice the invention
claimed in the non-provisional application.” 61 The New Railhead ruling, although not presenting
new interpretations of the provisional requirement reinforce for patent practitioners the
importance of a sufficient written description when filing provisional patent applications.
K.

Policy Considerations
Selling a product puts that product into the public domain. One of the policies of the on-

sale bar is to ensure that products in the public domain cannot later (more than one year) be
patented. As stated by the court in Abbott, “One of the primary purposes of the on-sale bar is to
prohibit the withdrawal of inventions that have been placed into the public domain through
commercialization…The discovery of a new property of an old compound does not make claims
to that compound patentable.” 62
The on-sale bar also aims to limit an inventor’s exclusive use of the claimed invention to
the patent term (twenty years from filing). The CAFC stated this policy in the STX opinion,

61
62

New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (2002).
Abbott, 182 F.3d at 1319.
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“The overriding concern of the on-sale bar is an inventor’s attempt to commercialize his
invention beyond the statutory term.” 63
V.

Practice Tips for Patent Prosecutors

It is questionable how much weight will be given to the statutory presumption of validity
and deference due to the USPTO in the context of an on-sale bar case. This is because the
USPTO is generally not aware of sales of the patented product, and the sales are first revealed at
court during patent litigation. In order for an inventor to strengthen the validity of a patent, it is
advisable to disclose any sales to the USPTO, so that the sales are “of record.” This disclosure
enables the USPTO Examiner to analyze the sales and determine if the application is patentable
in light of the sales; if the sales are of record, then the Examiner can take them into account
during the prosecution of the application. If the sales are made of record, a court is likely to
show more deference to the Examiner’s decision to allow the claims.
Due to the “absolute novelty” requirements in some countries, a non-provisional patent
application, or at least a provisional application, should be on file with the USPTO prior to
conducting any commercial sales activity, or even public experimental testing, in order to secure
a priority date prior to the first commercial offer for sale. Also, given that the on-sale bar applies
to sales of the patented product by third parties, it is advisable to file as early as possible to
ensure that there is a priority date prior to the patentee’s or another party’s first sales.
However, keep in mind that the provisional application must meet the requirements of
section 112 in order to provide a priority date. We have seen one-page provisional applications
that the inventor feels give them protection, but given the holding in New Railhead, it is clear

63

STX, 211 F.3d at 590.
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that a “quick and dirty” provisional is not advisable. At the very minimum, a provisional should
fully disclose the commercial embodiment which will be put on sale. In addition, remember that
a non-provisional and PCT application needs to be filed within one year of the provisional
application in order to have priority.
When conducting an experimental sales program to determine how well the invention is
working, ideally, the product should be given away, the customer told that the product is in “beta
testing,” and check with the customer periodically to determine how the product is performing.
As stated above, this type of public testing may not render the claims invalid in the United
States, but may affect the absolute novelty requirement internationally. If possible, file a patent
application before any type of public disclosure.
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